BRIEFING BOOK FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION

RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR ADDRESSING THE SECURITY RISKS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE

September 14, 2016
CONTENTS

i. THE CLIMATE AND SECURITY ADVISORY GROUP (CSAG) MEMBERS | 4

ii. HIGHLIGHTED RECOMMENDATIONS | 7

I. WHITE HOUSE | 9

II. DEFENSE | 11

III. FOREIGN POLICY | 16

IV. HOMELAND SECURITY | 20

V. INTELLIGENCE | 23

VI. ENERGY | 25

ABBREVIATIONS | 26
The Climate and Security Advisory Group (CSAG) is a voluntary, non-partisan group of U.S.-based military, national security, homeland security, intelligence and foreign policy experts from a broad range of institutions. The CSAG is chaired by the Center for Climate and Security in partnership with the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. See page 4 for a full list of participants.
I. THE CLIMATE AND SECURITY ADVISORY GROUP (CSAG) MEMBERS

Admiral Frank L. “Skip” Bowman, US Navy (ret)
Former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Advisory Board
The Center for Climate and Security

General Paul J. Kern, US Army (ret)
Former Commanding General of the Army Materiel Command

General Ronald E. Keys, US Air Force (ret)
Former Commander, Air Combat Command Chairman, CNA Military Advisory Board Advisory Board
The Center for Climate and Security

Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, US Navy (ret)
Former Commander, US Pacific Command Advisory Board
The Center for Climate and Security

General Gordon R. Sullivan, US Army (ret)
Former Chief of Staff, US Army Former Chairman, CNA Military Advisory Board

General Anthony C. Zinni, US Marine Corps (ret)
Former Command, U.S. Central Command Advisory Board
The Center for Climate and Security

Dr. Geoffrey Kemp
Former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1981-1985) Senior Director, Regional Security Center for the National Interest

Sherri Goodman
Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security) Founder and former Executive Director, CNA Military Advisory Board Public Policy Fellow Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief, US Strategic Command Advisory Board The Center for Climate and Security

Lieutenant General John G. Castellaw, US Marine Corps (ret)
Former Chief of Staff, US Central Command Advisory Board The Center for Climate and Security

Rear Admiral David W Titley, US Navy (ret)
Former Oceanographer, US Navy Advisory Board The Center for Climate and Security

Brigadier General Joseph R. “Bob” Barnes, US Army (ret)
Former Deputy Legal and Legislative Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Senior Advisor The Center for Climate and Security

Brigadier General Stephen A. Cheney, US Marine Corps (ret)
Former Inspector General, US Marine Corps Chief Executive Officer American Security Project
Brigadier General Gerald Galloway Jr., US Army (ret)
Former Dean, Academic Board, West Point
Professor of Engineering
University of Maryland

Joan VanDervort
Former Deputy Director, Ranges, Sea, and Airspace,
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Readiness)

Captain James Goudreau, SC, US Navy (ret)
Former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Energy)

Commander David M. Slayton, US Navy (ret)
Research Fellow
Co-Chair and Executive Director, Arctic Security Initiative
Hoover Institution, Stanford University

Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA (ret)
Distinguished Adjunct Professor of Government and Public Policy
College of William and Mary

Lieutenant Commander Oliver-Leighton Barrett, U.S. Navy (ret)
Senior Fellow
The Center for Climate and Security

Joshua W. Busby
Associate Professor
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
University of Texas at Austin

Elizabeth L. Chalecki, PhD
Asst. Professor, International Relations
Department of Political Science
University of Nebraska – Omaha

Nancy Colleton
President
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies

Taylor Dimsdale
Head of Research
E3G

Francesco Femia
Co-Founder and President
The Center for Climate and Security

Leon Fuerth
Former National Security Advisor to the Vice President
Senior Fellow
The Center for Climate and Security

Deborah Gordon
Director, Energy and Climate Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Lukas Haynes
Executive Director
The David Rockefeller Fund

Cullen S. Hendrix
Associate Professor
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

Andrew Holland
Director of Studies
Senior Fellow for Energy and Climate
American Security Project

Dr. Rachel Jonassen
Professional Lecturer and Visiting Scholar, School of Engineering and Applied Science
The George Washington University

Dr. Colin Kelley
Senior Research Fellow
The Center for Climate and Security

Dr. Marcus D. King
Director, Master of Arts
Associate Professor
The Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University

Marc Levy
Deputy Director
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Earth Institute
Columbia University
David Michel
Director, Environmental Security Program
The Stimson Center

Ashley Mcilvain Moran
State Fragility Initiative Director
Robert Strauss Center for International Security & Law
The University of Texas at Austin

Dr. Janne E. Nolan
International Affairs Professor
George Washington University
Advisory Board Member
The Center for Climate and Security

Christine Parthemore
Former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense

Constantine Samaras
Assistant Professor, Civil and Environmental
Engineering
Carnegie Mellon University

Nathan Sermonis
Executive Director
Partnership for a Secure America

Varun Sivaram
Douglas Dillon Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations

Stacy D. VanDeveer
Professor, Political Science
Carsey School of Public Policy
University of New Hampshire

Caitlin E. Werrell
Co-Founder and President
The Center for Climate and Security

Linda Yarr
Director
Partnership for International Strategies In Asia
George Washington University
II. HIGHLIGHTED RECOMMENDATIONS

According to the Department of Defense’s 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, climate change poses “immediate risks to national security.” These rapid changes in the climate are already exacerbating natural disasters, water, food, energy and health insecurities, contributing to conditions that can lead to conflict, state instability, and state failure, straining military readiness, operations and strategy, and making existing security threats worse. During both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations, the security community has taken steps to prepare for and reduce the risks climate change poses to the security landscape. Given that climate change affects all aspects of the security environment – including interactions with other state and non-state threats - these actions have been necessary to ensure the United States is able to protect and promote its interests. A growing consensus exists in the bipartisan US national security community that climate change presents a strategically significant risk to national and international security, and that more comprehensive action must be taken to ensure the US response is commensurate to the risk.

To save lives and money, strengthen national security, and demonstrate global leadership, a new administration must expand efforts to reduce and manage the security risks of climate change and seize the strategic opportunities presented by such efforts. The Climate and Security Advisory Group (CSAG) recommends that a new administration comprehensively address the security risks of climate change at all levels of national security planning, elevate and integrate attention to these risks across the US government, strengthen existing institutions and create new ones for addressing them. Specifically, the CSAG highlights ten topline recommendations drawn from the full recommendations below. We recommend that:

The President assign a cabinet-level official to lead on domestic climate change and security issues;

The National Security Advisor create a senior climate-security leadership position on the NSC Staff, reporting directly to the National Security Advisor, to help integrate plans to address climate-related impacts on national and international security priorities;

The Secretary of Defense designate a senior climate change and security chief within the immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense to cover the broad spectrum of infrastructural, operational and strategic risks posed by climate change;

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff address the security implications of climate change in advice and input into all elements of the Joint Strategic Planning System, and in guidance to the Combatant Commands;
The Secretary of State create a Climate and Security Office, led by a Climate and Security envoy, to promote intradepartmental integration of climate change and security concerns, and act as a primary State Department point of contact with DoD, other agencies and elements of the USG on climate change and security issues;

The USAID Administrator ensure that climate change and security analysis are incorporated across USAID programming;

The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations address climate security at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC);

The Secretary of Homeland Security work with other federal and non-federal entities to develop a National Adaptation and Resilience Strategy to improve the nation’s climate resiliency and preparedness for climate and weather extremes;

The Director of National Intelligence and agencies and entities in the Intelligence Community bolster the capacity and authority of the Director of Environment and Natural Resources at the National Intelligence Council, and prioritize climate change and security-related assessments;

The Secretary of Energy seek and allocate resources for the DOE National Laboratories to conduct and disseminate research and assessments of the potential impacts of climate change on U.S. national security.

The full recommendations, organized by offices, departments and agencies to which they are directed, are below
I. WHITE HOUSE

Recommendations for the Executive Office of the President

As the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and countless other sources confirm, the impacts of climate change are already contributing to the conditions that can lead to conflict, state instability, and state failure. Climate change is also straining military readiness, operations and strategy, and is making existing security risks worse. We recommend that a new President pursue three key objectives: 1) Elevate attention to the security risks of climate change at all levels of national security planning to ensure it is treated as comprehensively as other strategically significant security risks; 2) Institutionalize climate change and security concerns throughout all relevant U.S. government offices, agencies and departments; and 3) Integrate climate change and security concerns across the U.S. government through structures, procedures and actions designed to effectively and routinely reduce and respond to climate-related risks. Specifically, we recommend that:

The President
Reduce the risks of climate change to domestic and international security by:

1.1. Elevating leadership on climate and security. Assign a cabinet-level official reporting directly to the President to fill a leadership role on domestic climate change and security issues. This position would coordinate directly with the National Security Advisor, the National Security Council Staff (NSC), and the leadership and staffs of relevant departments and agencies. These would include but not be limited to NOAA, NASA, CEQ, OSTP, the Department of the Interior (DoI), and the Department of Defense (DoD) with regard to key domestic defense infrastructure and supply chains;


1.3. Improving capacity to absorb climate and security information. Enhance the capacity of the U.S. government to collect, integrate, analyze, and disseminate climate change information, including the creation of a central government-wide climate change information repository for consolidating and assessing multiple climate forecasts and associated risks (including data from both the physical and social sciences);
1.4. Bolstering interagency coordination on Arctic climate and security issues. Strengthen inter-agency coordination between all federal agencies that oversee U.S. Arctic policy, supporting funding for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the Department of Commerce (DoC), the Department of the Interior (DoI), and DoD so that they are adequately resourced and equipped (including an adequate icebreaker fleet) to carry out their defense, homeland security, environmental disaster response, and search and rescue missions in the Arctic;

1.5. Matching strategies and plans with budgetary support. Direct the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to:

   1.5.1. Annually conduct a cross-cut budget review as required to ensure the adequacy of agency budget requests relating to identifying and responding to the security risks posed by climate change, as well as identify and address associated budgetary gaps and duplications;

   1.5.2. Establish specific budget lines within the Department of State (DoS), USAID, and the DoD for developing plans, tools and strategies to support conflict prevention programs in at risk countries and regions.

1.6. Addressing climate and security risks in key geostrategic waterways. Protect U.S. strategic interests in key geostrategic waterways, including the Arctic and the South China Sea, and ensuring that risk assessments of engagement in these regions include analysis of the range of potential security posture scenarios related to continued changes in the climate;

1.7. Bolstering the U.S. Asia-Pacific rebalance with support for allies and partners on climate and security: Launch a Climate Security Asia-Pacific Initiative - a unified climate security plan that fully supports our national security, foreign policy and defense strategies in the Asia-Pacific region.

The National Security Advisor
Coordinate agency strategies and capacities to effectively advise the President, the senior Cabinet-level lead official on climate and security, and relevant departments and agencies on preparing for and managing the domestic and international security risks of climate change by:

1.8. Elevating leadership on climate and security. Appoint a Senior Climate and Security Director on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, ensuring that she or he reports directly to the National Security Advisor, includes both international and domestic security considerations in her or his mandate, has the mission and staff to address the climate change and security nexus from a “whole of government” perspective, and works with other agencies to assess and address these risks;

1.9. Creating and leading a robust interagency on climate and security. Establish an interagency Climate Change and Security Group, led by the Senior Climate and Security Director at the NSC, that includes officials of relevant departments and agencies at the Assistant Secretary level or equivalent with an emphasis on strengthening data monitoring and assessment methodologies, and integrating approaches within and across agencies to better anticipate and respond to climate change and security issues;

1.10. Enhancing staff capacity on climate and security. Ensure that all DoD, DoS and Intelligence Community (IC) leads within the NSC Staff have the capacity and resources to address the climate-security nexus within their scope of responsibilities.

“APPOINT A SENIOR CLIMATE AND SECURITY DIRECTOR ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR”
II. DEFENSE

Recommendations for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The DoD’s 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap identifies climate change as posing “immediate risks to the nation,” an assessment that was echoed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. The U.S. military has for years been a leader in addressing the risk to national security posed by climate change - a phenomenon that acts as a “threat multiplier,” exacerbating natural disasters, water, food and energy insecurities, contributing to conditions that can catalyze conflict, instability, and state failure, and exacerbating existing security risks.

In such a world, the U.S. military could find itself drawn into more post facto responses to climate-related risks once they materialize, leading to costly response efforts and operational unpreparedness, as well as making other security priorities more difficult to manage. On the opportunity side, climate-related investments would help maintain readiness and operational effectiveness, and if focused on strategically-significant regions of the world, could play an important role in elevating U.S., allied and partner nation influence. In this context, we recommend that the DoD build on its past leadership by further elevating, institutionalizing and integrating climate change and security concerns. Specifically, we recommend that:

The Secretary of Defense

Fully integrate climate change security concerns into DoD priorities by:

2.1. Building on recent progress. Ensure full implementation of the DoD Directive on climate change adaptation and resilience (DoDD 4715.21);

2.2. Elevating leadership attention to climate and security risks. Designate a senior Climate Change and Security Lead within the immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to cover all aspects of climate change and security risks (infrastructural, operational and strategic), including how those risks interact with other security priorities;

2.3. Broadening the scope of attention to climate and security risks. Broaden the leadership and reporting chain of the AT&L-led Senior Sustainability Council (SSC) to include additional representation from OUSD (Policy) and the Joint Staff with responsibilities for strategy and operations. This expanded SSC would;

"DESIGNATE A SENIOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY LEAD WITHIN THE IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE"
2.3.1. Include a broader array of officials with responsibilities for strategy and operations, including from OSD-Policy, the JCS/Joint Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the military services, and other agencies;

2.3.2. Provide analysis and advice on preparing and responding to the impacts of climate change on the broader strategic environment, including population displacement, terrorism, state stability and conflict, and on existing or potential DoD operational missions and interagency support requirements;

2.3.3. Create an Action Officer-level working group tasked with addressing the strategic and operational risks of climate change;

2.3.4. Submit a semi-annual report to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the broader strategic and operational impacts of climate change, measures to address such impacts, and progress in developing and implementing such measures;

2.3.5. Provide input to OUSD (AT&L) on actions, policies, and resource allocations to enhance military readiness to strategic and operational impacts of climate change.

2.4. Enhancing capabilities in a melting Arctic. Enhance existing efforts to prepare for increased access and military operations in the Arctic, including through:

2.4.1. Strengthening coordination with other Federal agencies that oversee U.S. Arctic policy;

2.4.2. Supporting increased funding, including in agency budgets outside the DoD such as the Coast Guard’s portion of the DHS budget, within the overall President’s Budget Request to adequately carry out national priorities in the Arctic, including fulfillment of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013), National Ocean Policy (2010), National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66 on Arctic Region Policy (2009), and recapitalization of the U.S. Icebreaker Fleet;

2.4.3. Considering a rationalization of the CCMD structure for the Arctic, with an emphasis on providing simplification, unity of command, and efficient execution of requirements and sourcing;

2.4.4. Building up local infrastructure in the Arctic to support logistically-complex operations in the AOR.

2.5. Elevating attention to the broader array of strategic and operational security risks associated with climate change. Advance understanding of how climate change will affect force health protection needs (CONUS and OCONUS) given climate-driven shifts in disease vectors and other trends outlined in recent studies;

2.6. Offering guidance, tools and resources. Give the Combatant Commands (CCMDs) the Military Departments, and the Defense Agencies the guidance, tools and resources they need to address climate change risks. This can be achieved by developing guidance for integrating climate change risks into the Defense Strategic Guidance, Defense Planning Guidance, and other strategy and program/budget guidance, and into CCMDs’ deliberate planning processes, strategic assessments, joint exercises and cooperative security programs, including through the Guidance on the Development of the Force (GDF), Guidance on the Employment of the Force (GEF);
2.7. Supporting the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). Direct that the GCCs:

2.7.1. Address climate-security concerns as a strategic security risk in Theater Campaign Plans and Theater Security Cooperation Plans, with an emphasis on the stabilizing benefits and low cost of adaptation efforts on conflict avoidance;

2.7.2. Enhance mission resilience through working in concert with appropriate U.S. government agencies/offices to support partner nation capabilities, including within their militaries, to build national and sub-national capacities to address the security impacts of climate change and climate-related events, including the effects of both slow- and rapid-onset environmental degradation on national stability and security;

2.7.3. Factor into their deliberate and contingency planning processes (OPLANS and CONPLANS) the potential for ongoing climatic shifts to contribute to near and/or over-the-horizon instances of instability (e.g. mass migration, breakdown in rule of law, etc.) within their respective AOR’s;

2.7.4. Significantly increase engagement with partner nation militaries (via bilateral and/or regional mechanisms) on military capacity building programs to support civilian government efforts to adapt to climate change, and mitigate the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation on the military operations, operational energy, installations, and force readiness;

2.7.5. Adopt, with appropriate regional variances, the post-disaster and water resource planning approaches employed by PACOM and AFRICOM, including the incorporation of measures to increase climate resilience.

2.8. Addressing climate change risks in military doctrine. Direct full incorporation of actions to reduce and respond to the current and projected impacts of climate change in all relevant military doctrine (e.g., service doctrine, joint doctrine), instruction, guidance, and policy;

2.9. Integrating DoD’s efforts to address the security risks of climate change with the DoS. This should include sharing weather and climate services data, and expanding traditional international security cooperation to encompass climate change and security matters, including through joint exercises, training, and the sale/provision of military equipment suitable for disaster risk reduction and responses to other impacts of climate change by partner militaries;

2.10. Addressing climate change risks across the service branches. Build on the successes of the U.S. Navy Task Force Climate Change by directing the development of similar institutional models for addressing climate change in each of the other services, with the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force addressing areas in line with their own equities, expertise and interest;

2.11. Fully integrating the National Guard into climate and security programs and measures. Direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to include emphasis in the National Guard State Partnership Program and other National Guard international engagement programs on enhancing the capability of the militaries and other agencies of partner nations by building on existing state partnership initiatives on climate change adaptation, and on enhancing their capabilities to reduce the risk of, and if necessary respond to, climate-related natural disasters;
2.12. Integrating climate and security risks into security assistance programs. Direct the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to coordinate with the DoS on measures to fully integrate within the overall security assistance programs the training, equipment, and other resources that will assist partner nations in strengthening their capacity to protect key defense installations and infrastructure and to respond to and provide assistance to civil authorities in disaster risk reduction and response actions;

2.13. Raising the profile of climate risks and opportunities at key international security institutions. Direct leadership to bring climate change and security risks to the center of the agendas and priorities of international security institutions such as NATO, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meetings, the African Union, as well as important international security forums, such as the Munich Security Conference, the Halifax International Security Forum and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable;

2.14. Expanding threat reduction mandates. Broaden the mandate of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) and the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) to include the security risks of climate change;

2.15. Filling key climate change and security data gaps. Enhance understanding of climate change impacts on security by bolstering DoD-funded research programs (and programs funded jointly with other agencies) devoted to decreasing uncertainty regarding climate change impacts on the future strategic and operational environment, including forecasts for how climate change may affect operational readiness, and the corresponding likely type and cost of future missions (including budgetary analyses of climate impacts and cost savings associated with climate preparedness);

2.16. Improving and sustaining research-to-operations capabilities. As DoD-funded research programs continue to provide key insights into climate change impacts, CCMDs must be able to properly utilize that research in their deliberate planning processes, strategic assessments, joint exercises and cooperative security programs. Ensure research results, operationally usable models, and other tools are transitioned to the strategic, operational and readiness communities for applied use. Consideration must be made at the highest levels of DoD for sustainment of these operational models as DoD climate service providers use them to translate climate change impacts to DoD operations;

2.17. Working with DoS and USAID to address the climate-water-energy terrorism nexus. Engage USAID to explore focusing efforts on regions abroad with underlying climatic and natural resource conditions that international terrorist organizations are exploiting or may exploit in the future, such as vulnerable water supplies and energy systems;

2.18. Advancing climate and security education. Incorporate climate and security and environmental security topics into the course offerings of defense sector educational institutions to enhance understanding among U.S., allied and partner-nation military officers of the effects of climate change on military strategy, operations, operational energy, installations, and readiness;

2.19. Continuing to enhance the resilience of military infrastructure. Identify climate and sea level rise vulnerabilities to infrastructure that will reduce DOD’s ability to generate and sustain military readiness, and invest in required adaptation.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

_Elevate, institutionalize, and integrate climate change and security concerns by:_

2.20. **Integrating climate risks into strategic planning.** Address the observed and projected security implications of climate change in the Chairman’s advice and input to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and President on the formulation and implementation of the National Security Strategy (NSS), and all elements of the Joint Strategic Planning System, including the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the attendant Joint Planning Document (JPD), the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA), the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JCSP), the Strategic Military Intelligence Review (SIR), and other strategic guidance, plans and reviews;

2.21. **Elevating leadership attention to climate and security risks.** Task the Director of the Joint Staff with ensuring that all elements of the Joint Staff include appropriate consideration of the security risks of climate change in performing their roles and responsibilities, to include providing support to the Vice Chairman, the Assistant to the Chairman, and members of the Joint Staff in related internal DoD and interagency processes;

2.22. **Supporting the Secretary of Defense.** Assist the Secretary of Defense in operationalizing the recommendations for the Secretary of Defense specified above, insofar as those recommendations are related to matters involving the interagency, Combatant Commands, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and/ or Joint Staff, and report to the Secretary of Defense on the status of the implementation of actions by the Combatant Commands, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Staff;

2.23. **Adapting approaches to climate and security risks.** Recommend modifications to, and new actions related to, managing climate change and security risks, based on new information and feedback from the Combatant Commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, and the Intelligence Community.

*“ADDRESS THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE CHAIRMAN’S ADVICE AND INPUT INTO ALL ELEMENTS OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM, AND IN THE CHAIRMAN’S GUIDANCE TO THE COMBATANT COMMANDS”*
U.S. foreign policy priorities will affect, and be affected by, the security risks of a changing climate. In this context, the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) highlighted climate change as one of four strategic priorities for the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). However, in order to fully commit to addressing climate change as a strategic priority, the DoS as a whole must more fully integrate attention to the issue across its operations, bureaus and offices. The CSAG therefore recommends that a new Secretary of State, U.S. Administrator and Ambassador to the United Nations prioritize reducing climate change-related security risks by further elevating, institutionalizing and integrating climate change and security concerns within their respective institutions. Specifically, we recommend that:

**The Secretary of State**

*Enhance attention to the security risks of climate change within the Department by:*

1. **Elevating leadership attention to climate and security risks.** Create a Climate and Security Office, led by a career Ambassador-level individual with a non-UNFCCC mandate (e.g., a Climate and Security Envoy), to promote intradepartmental integration of climate change and security concerns, working with international partners and embassies on climate change and security issues (such as the G7 Working Group on Climate and Fragility), briefing the Secretary of State and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, recruiting a staff with expertise in peace and security, as well as in climate, water, and other natural resources, and acting as a primary point of contact with DoD and other agencies and elements of the USG on climate change and security issues;

2. **Involving leadership with mandates related to other security risks.** Ensure that the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs and the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs are involved in the development of climate change and security planning and implementation in full coordination with appropriate officials of the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the National Security Council;

3. **Providing expertise to the National Security Council.** Ensuring that the DoS leads within the NSC staff have the capacity to address the climate-security nexus within their scope of responsibilities;

4. **Building on recent progress.** Continue to regularly convene the State Department Task Force on Climate Resilience and Security. The Task Force should focus particularly on:
3.4.1. Developing measures to improve intra-departmental and inter-departmental coordination on measures to address the security impacts of climate change;

3.4.2. Exploring what additional resources may be directed to climate change and security programming, with a specific focus on the nexus of adaptation, disaster and conflict risk;

3.4.3. Identifying a mechanism for coordination of Mission Resource Requests relevant to the security impacts of climate change;

3.4.4. Leveraging the coordination role of Regional Environmental Offices (REO’s) by providing them with the personnel and resources needed to assist in coordination among Chiefs of Missions, USAID offices, and CCMDs on projects addressing the security implications of climate change.

3.5. **Maintaining an Arctic focus.** Appoint a Special Representative on the Arctic Region, and ensure that her or his mandate includes climate and security priorities;

3.6. **Learning from the last QDDR.** Continue to ensure a robust consideration of climate change-related human and national security risks in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), with additional emphasis on strengthening the roles of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs and the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs;

3.7. **Integrating climate and security into conflict avoidance efforts.** Expand the scope, staffing and other resources of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and other elements within the Department of State with a role in conflict avoidance/prevention and post-conflict stabilization to include enhancing resilience to the effects of climate change as a principal means of reducing the risk of regional conflict and instability in the medium to long term;

3.8. **Integrating climate and security issues into security assistance and cooperation programs.** Direct that the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs and the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs work with their counterparts in the DoD to fully integrate addressing the security impacts of climate change in security assistance and security cooperation programs measures, including training and equipping, in order to strengthen the capacity of partner militaries to identify and respond to the security impacts of climate change, including providing support civil authorities in disaster risk and response activities;

3.9. **Providing support to the Combatant Commands.** Direct that the Political Advisors assigned to the various geographic Combatant Commands of the DoD include addressing the security risks of climate change in their advice to the Commanders of those Commands. This includes advice on ways in which programs, policies, and projects of the DoS can assist in addressing the security risks of climate change, such as by including such activities in Theater Security Cooperation Plans and other relevant DoD plans, programs, and activities, including those related to Foreign Military Sales and other security assistance programs;

3.10. **Addressing the intersection of climate and energy security.** Strengthen the staffing and resources in the Bureau of Energy Resources to provide capacity for this Bureau to account for climate change risks throughout the Department’s energy diplomacy. This includes maintaining and bolstering the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Transformation and integrating climate risks into the Bureau’s efforts to promote energy security;
3.11. **Addressing climate and security risks with joint DoS-DoD funds.** Support an expansion of the mandate of the Global Security and Contingency Fund, jointly administered with the DoD, to include activities for addressing climate-related security risks;

3.12. **Setting standards for reporting progress.** Direct that all regional bureaus at DoS, all Chiefs of Missions, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) report on their activities to integrate climate change and security concerns, including adaptation and risk reduction measures, into their agendas and program budget requests;

3.13. **Leading on climate and security issues at the G7.** Take action on the recommendations of the G7 Working Group on Climate and Fragility and continuing to support the working group through collaboration and additional resources;

3.14. **Integrating climate into water-sharing agreements.** Encourage parties to international water-sharing agreements to update those agreements to account for the impact of climate change on transboundary water security;

3.15. **Utilizing climate adaptation support to engage strategically-significant regions:** Explore innovative ways of increasing international investments in climate change adaptation and mitigation in the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, and other regions of core strategic interest to the United States, as a means of broadening and deepening alliances in these regions, enhancing regional stability and combating emerging threats.

---

**The Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)**

*Elevate, integrate and institutionalize climate change and security concerns by:*

3.16. **Integrate climate and security analysis.** Ensure that climate change and security analysis is incorporated across USAID programming and that USAID offices are aware of and make use of resources like the Climate Change and Conflict Annex to the USAID Climate-Resilient Development Framework, and the Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF 2.0); and the Water and Conflict Toolkit;

3.17. **Leading on climate and security issues at the G7.** Work closely with the State Department on actions related to the recommendations of the G7 Working Group on Climate and Fragility and continuing to support the working group through collaboration and additional resources;

3.18. **Integrating climate and security into conflict mitigation and management.** Further integrate climate and security variables into the analytical models of USAID’s Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management (CMM), and strengthen direct ties between this office and other elements of USAID and all relevant State offices and bureaus, including the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs;

---

“ENSURE THAT CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS IS INCORPORATED ACROSS USAID PROGRAMMING”
3.19. **Providing support to the Combatant Commands.** Direct that the Senior Development Advisors to the geographic Combatant Commands provide information and advice to those Commands on programs, policies, and projects for addressing the security risks of climate change, such as by measures to enhance the climate resilience of states within the geographic area of responsibility of those Commands.

**“ADDRESS THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC)”**

**The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations**

*Elevate, integrate and institutionalize climate change and security concerns by:*

3.20. **Promoting a Joint Task Force on Climate Change and Security at the UN.** Advance the creation by the UN Secretary General (UNSG) of a Joint Task Force on Climate Change and Security, led by a UN Special Envoy for Climate Change and Security, and consisting of expert representatives from relevant UN institutions, to produce an assessment of the capacity of the UN as a whole to address the security implications of climate change;

3.21. **Supporting a climate and security resolution at the UNGA.** Urge a new resolution on climate change and security at the UNGA, building on the resolution from 2009, including a request to the SG for an update to his 2009 report on climate change and security and an assessment of the implementation of the 2009 resolution;

3.22. **Elevating attention to climate and security issues at the UNSC.** Continue to raise climate change and security issues at the UNSC, and promotion of actions by the UNSC, UNGA, other UN institutions, regional security organizations, and member States, that go beyond previous efforts, such as the 2011 Presidential Statement under the German presidency;

3.23. **Advancing a UNSC early identification system for climate and conflict.** Develop actions by the UNSC on early identification of zones where climate change could increase the risk of conflict, providing technical support on climate and security issues to the UNGA and other UN institutions, and exploring the possibility of a legal framework for the status of cross-border climate migrants.
IV. HOMELAND SECURITY

Recommendations for the Secretary of Homeland Security

As evidenced by the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is doing important work to address the risks to the nation posed by climate change. Climate change is a phenomenon that will increasingly act as a “threat multiplier,” exacerbating natural disasters, water, food, energy and infrastructure insecurities, contributing to rising sea levels threatening coastal and island communities, and driving an increase in natural and cascading disasters related to drought and extreme weather events, potentially leading to significant loss of lives, livelihoods, infrastructure and economic prosperity. The QHSR, the DHS Climate Adaptation Roadmap(s), and key associated programs are positive steps that will ultimately save American lives, infrastructure, and resources. But as the climate continues to change at an unprecedented rate, it is recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security further elevate, institutionalize, and integrate climate change and security concerns within the Department. Specifically, we recommend that:

"DEVELOP A NATIONAL ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE STRATEGY"

The Secretary of Homeland Security

Enhance attention to the security risks of climate change by:

4.1. Developing a National Adaptation and Resilience Strategy. Build on the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review to work with other federal and non-federal entities to develop a National Adaptation and Resilience Strategy with specific actions for the U.S. to improve its resiliency and preparedness for climate and weather extremes, as well as gradual climate changes;

4.2. Collaborating with other partners. Engage partners outside DHS in building resilience to climate and security risks, including through:

4.2.1. Working with the interagency community and the private sector to seek common areas of interest and cooperation on climate-related risks;

4.2.2. Including representatives of critical civilian and military infrastructure/key resources communities in climate change adaptation planning, including those involving sea-level rise;

4.2.3. Cooperating with local, state, and tribal governments and disaster response organizations to ensure compatibility and support standards are developed and adopted;

4.2.4. Strengthening coordination with other federal agencies with U.S. Arctic policy roles;

4.2.5. Supporting regional initiatives to ensure that more comprehensive and actionable information about projected climate change, especially in the near to mid-term, is available to local, state, and tribal governments and to the private sector;
4.2.6. Supporting regional initiatives to develop additional local, state, tribal, and private sector capacity to respond to or prepare for climate and weather extremes, as well as for gradual changes in our climate and environmental conditions, such as rising sea level and ocean acidification.

4.3. **Focusing attention on the intersection of domestic and international security issues.** Engage the broader security community to develop preventive solutions to climate-exacerbated homeland security risks that originate outside U.S. borders;

4.3.1. Assist in focusing the attention of the broader security community, both within and beyond the local, state, tribal, and federal governments, to climate change impacts on certain fragile nations, and regions such as the Arctic, that are likely to affect homeland security equities;

4.3.2. Sponsor and encourage a greater emphasis on research on the near term effects of climate change on U.S. critical infrastructure and regional instability in the “abroad” that could impact homeland security equities.

4.4. **Building on the QHSR.** Expand efforts to address domestic climate and security risks by building on the significant attention to climate change in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), and the nation-wide community engagement on these issues this has helped foster;

4.5. **Elevating attention to the broader array of domestic security risks associated with climate change.** This should include advancing understanding of how climate change will affect health security in the United States, given climate-driven shifts in disease vectors and other trends outlined in recent studies;

4.6. **Integrating climate and security issues across DHS.** Direct all DHS entities, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to incorporate climate change and extreme weather event risks into all future Strategic National Risk Assessments, including but not limited to the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, National Preparedness Goals, and the appropriate National Frameworks;

4.7. **Supporting actionable data.** Continue to support federal science agencies to obtain the best available science, data, and models for decisions at the national, regional, State, and local levels;

4.8. **Creating an Arctic strategy.** Develop an integrated DHS Arctic strategy to ensure that all department missions are executed in the changing operational environment. This includes:

  4.8.1. Ensuring that DHS components develop individual strategies to support their specific missions;

  4.8.2. Supporting funding for the core elements of an Arctic strategy to enable DHS to carry out Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25 on Arctic Region Policy (2009);

  4.8.3. Committing to re-capitalizing the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker fleet in the near- to mid-term.
4.9. **Advancing climate-security education.** Prioritize climate and security education within DHS and with other partners. This includes:

4.9.1. Creating and promoting climate and security courses at the Homeland Security Institute and other educational entities within the department;

4.9.2. Supporting the development of statewide training programs on climate preparedness and disaster risk reduction with an emphasis on training members of the National Guard and other key first responders.

4.10. **Prioritizing pre-disaster risk reduction.** Assume a leadership role within the Executive Branch on pre-disaster risk reduction through:

4.10.1. Developing legislative proposals to provide additional federal authorities and funding (both on and off-budget) for pre-disaster risk reduction measures that will result in significant out-year cost savings in terms of reducing the number and scale of natural disasters requiring a federal response;

4.10.2. Developing legislative proposals for changes in the Stafford Act and other disaster risk reduction and post-disaster recovery authorities that will provide for more extensive incorporation of enhanced disaster risk reduction measures in the context of federally funded and supported programs for post-disaster recovery response.

4.11. **Integrating climate change into risk tools.** Advance the integration of the impacts of climate change into risk assessment, risk reduction, and loss estimation tools.
The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has done important work in assessing the security risks of a changing climate - a phenomenon that acts as a “threat multiplier” and “accelerant of instability,” exacerbating existing risks to U.S. national security, and potentially creating new ones. The annual “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the “Global Trends 2030” report, the “Impact of Climate Change to 2030” series of regional assessments, and the “Intelligence Community Assessment on Global Water Security,” are critical steps in advancing understanding of the national security risks of climate change. But as the IC has noted, the climate continues to change at an unprecedented rate. In this context, the CSAG recommends that the U.S. Intelligence Community further elevate, institutionalize and integrate climate change and security concerns within their institutions. Specifically, we recommend that:

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and other entities in the Intelligence Community (IC)

Improve intelligence on the security risks of climate change by:

5.1. Elevating leadership attention to climate and security risks. Bolster the capacity and authority of the director of Environment and Natural Resources at the National Intelligence Council, and prioritize climate change and security-related assessments;

5.2. Building staff capacity to assess climate and security risks. This includes;

5.2.1 Create a National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for climate change and security to assist in developing, integrating, and providing to intelligence consumers the best available intelligence assessments on the impacts of climate change on national and international security;

5.2.2 Strongly support, and increase the capacity for, the continuation of intelligence assessments on the security implications of climate change for the United States homeland, partner and fragile state stability, U.S. supply chain, market access, and energy logistics disruptions.

5.3. Establishing a climate and security hub. Advance the reestablishment of a Center for Climate and National Security at the Central Intelligence Agency in order to drive more regular and improved intelligence assessments of the security implications of climate change;
5.4. **Improving predictive tools.** Better integrate climate change and security-related dynamics into predictive tools and assessments of state fragility;

5.5. **Developing actionable intelligence on climate and security.** Systematically obtain input from the various executive branch agencies on their specific operational needs and priorities for actionable information and intelligence products to support investment/procurement planning in the near-term, mid-term, and long range;

5.6. **Reestablishing information-sharing structures.** Recommit to and build on information-sharing processes with domestic and international partners, such as Medea and related programs;

5.7. **Developing actionable intelligence.** Increase understanding of factors linking climate events to outcomes of security concern, and generate greater granularity at the national and subnational levels to support the provision of actionable intelligence on climate-related security risks, especially in the near to mid-term;

5.8. **Prioritizing climate and security intelligence.** Support the inclusion of climate change and its interrelated “threat multiplier” associations within the National Intelligence Priority Framework;

5.9. **Promoting climate and security education.** Ensure the course offerings of intelligence sector educational institutions include climate change and security and environmental security dimensions.
VI. ENERGY

Recommendations for the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories are national scientific resources with a unique set of capabilities: broad expertise in theoretical, experimental, and observational science across a wide range of disciplines, including climate studies; access to unsurpassed supercomputing power for both classified and unclassified research; and direct ongoing cooperation with both DoD and IC agencies and with academic institutions. The Laboratories can play a key role in informing USG assessments on future impacts of climate change on the U.S. national security. Specifically, we recommend that:

“SEEK AND ALLOCATE RESOURCES FOR THE DOE NATIONAL LABORATORIES TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AND ASSESSMENTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS TO US NATIONAL SECURITY”

The U.S. Secretary of Energy

Address climate change and security concerns via the National Laboratories by:

6.1. Building national lab capacity. Seek and allocate resources for the DOE National Laboratories to conduct and disseminate research and assessments of climate change risks to U.S. national security;

6.2. Addressing the intersection of climate change and nuclear security. Advance research programs that explore the intersection of climate change and nuclear security risks, as well as the nexus of climate policy and nuclear security to help ensure that there are complementary gains across these issue sets. For example, connecting climate and nuclear issues may create new diplomatic opportunities that could help build the trust and confidence required for discussions on other difficult security issues, such as nuclear proliferation. Multilateral and international mechanisms that originally focus on climate concerns may also be grown or leveraged in the future to further mitigate nuclear risks, and vice versa.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has direct responsibility for a number of strategic facilities that serve critical national security missions. Past events, including wildfires and extreme weather, have demonstrated the vulnerability of these facilities to environmental forces. In this context, the CSAG recommends that:

The Administrator of the NNSA

Address climate change and security concerns by:

6.3. Integrating climate change into vulnerability assessments. Ensure that vulnerability assessments and continuity-of-operation planning for strategic NNSA facilities that are critical to national security fully incorporate assessments on potential climate change impacts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;L</td>
<td>Acquisition, Technology and Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEQ</td>
<td>Council on Environmental Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMM</td>
<td>Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Consolidated Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Chairman’s Program Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPG</td>
<td>Contingency Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAG</td>
<td>Climate and Security Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of National Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoC</td>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoDD</td>
<td>DoD Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoI</td>
<td>Department of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of Seven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDF</td>
<td>Guidance on the Development of the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance of the Employment of the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSPD</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCSP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPD</td>
<td>Joint Planning Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>Joint Strategy Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIO</td>
<td>National Intelligence Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNSA</td>
<td>National Nuclear Security Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOAA</td>
<td>National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>Outside the Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan in Complete Format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSTP</td>
<td>Office of Science and Technology Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD</td>
<td>Office of the Undersecretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QHSR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Homeland Security Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REO</td>
<td>Regional Environmental Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIR</td>
<td>Strategic Military Intelligence Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BRIEFING BOOK FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION

RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR ADDRESSING THE SECURITY RISKS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE

The Climate and Security Advisory Group (CSAG) is a voluntary, non-partisan group of U.S.-based military, national security, homeland security, intelligence and foreign policy experts from a broad range of institutions. The CSAG is chaired by the Center for Climate and Security in partnership with the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.